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EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATIVE
ABROGATION OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
In the mid-1970s the frequency and severity of medical malpractice
awards began to rise rapidly and, accordingly, medical malpractice insurance
either became unavailable or significantly more expensive.' In addition, the
1. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69-70 (1986) (citing rising frequency and severity
of malpractice claims as causing increased malpractice insurance premiums); Learner, Restrictive
Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to
Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 143, 144-45 (1981) (acknowledging
increasing number of medical malpractice claims as cause of medical malpractice crisis). While
some commentators have labelled the tumultuous events of the 1970s a "crisis," other
commentators have rejected this label. See Sanderson, Medical Practice and Malpractice: 1981,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRAC., June 1981, at 1 (crisis existed only in professional liability
insurance market); see also Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A
Retrospective, 49 LAw & CoNTmnp. PRoas. 5, 7 n.13 (1986) (malpractice insurance costs total
less than 1% of total health care expenditures). Reasons for the increasing number of medical
malpractice claims filed include a breakdown in patient trust and admiration for the physician,
increased litigiousness as the public became more aware of legal rights, publicity of high jury
awards in medical malpractice cases, and lawyers' contingency fee schemes. See L. LANDER,
DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RIsK, ANGER AND THE MALPRACTICE Caisis 36-56 (1978) (modern doctor-
patient relationship has shifted from healing relationship to market transaction resulting in
commodification of healing); D. LousEL & H. WLIAis, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 5.02, at
137-38 (1977) (breakdown in patient trust and admiration for physician has resulted in more
medical malpractice claims filed); D. LouisEL & H. WI.LAms, supra, at § 20.07 (public has
growing awareness of legal rights); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, Pub No. (OS)
73-88, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice 6-12 (1973) [hereinafter
HEW Report] (high jury awards in medical malpractice cases have gained extensive media
attention); HEW Report, supra, at 32 (many physicians attribute increase in medical malpractice
claims to lawyers' contingent fee system). But see Robinson, supra, at 14 (contingent fee
system encourages attorney to invest in cases promising highest returns but falls to explain
why attorneys suddenly focused disproportionately on malpractice cases). Another suggested
cause of the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance is that insurance companies are unable
to determine accurate rates because of the uncertainty arising from the recent volatility in the
malpractice insurance market. Learner, supra, at 145 (erratic and increasingly higher awards
create uncertainty in determining insurance rates). Insurance companies reacted to the erratic
and rising awards by imposing artificially high premiums to protect themselves against the
uncertainty in the market. See id. (insurance companies charge inflated premiums to protect
against instability in insurance market). An additional explanation of the increased insurance
costs implicates insurance companies as reaping profits from unjustifiably high premiums. See
id. (insurance companies reaping profits by overcharging); D. LOuiSELL & H. WLLwis, supra,
at § 20.07 n. 56 (implicating insurance companies as profiting from insurance crisis). A fourth
explanation for the higher insurance rates is a combination of a general decline in the standards
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insurance industry experienced an exodus of insurance carriers from mal-
practice underwriting.2 To combat the rising medical malpractice insurance
costs, many state legislatures enacted medical malpractice reform legislation
which, in part, abolished the common-law Collateral Source Rule.3 In
of medical practice and more frequent mistakes related to complex medical technology. See
Learner, supra, at 146 (noting decline in quality of medical care and complex technology
causing more mistakes as reason for medical malpractice insurance crisis); Robinson, supra,
at 11 (noting possibility that medical procedures and technology increase risk of injury). But
see Robinson, supra, at 11 (dismissing for lack of evidence assertion that declining standards
of medical practice caused insurance crisis).
In 1962 a physician paid 0.5 % of the physician's gross income for professional liability
insurance. See HEWReport, supra, at 38-40 (documenting rise in medical malpractice insurance
rates). By 1970 a physician paid 1.8 % of gross income for similar coverage. Id. Coincident
to rising rates, many insurance companies withdrew from underwriting medical malpractice
liability insurance. Learner, supra, at 144 (documenting insurance industry in mid-70s);
Robinson, supra, at 5 (noting volatility of insurance market in mid-1970s). Despite the rising
costs and fleeing insurance companies, disagreement still arises regarding whether a "crisis"
actually existed. See D. LOuiSELL & H. WILLIAms, supra, at § 20.07 n. 55 (questioning whether
medical malpractice insurance crisis existed in mid-1970s); Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The
Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INs. L. J. 90, 96 (1976) (suggesting that insurance
industry's refusal to disclose rate calculations renders impossible any accurate conclusion
concerning existence of insurance crisis); Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INs. COUNSEL
J. 228, 231 (1978) (acknowledging claims denying existence of insurance crisis). In the late
1970s premiums remained stable. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTiCE: THEORY, EvIDENCE
& PUBLIC POLICY 97 (1985) (documenting medical malpractice insurance rates from 1975 to
1985). However, medical malpractice insurance rates now are rising again. Id.
2. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 5-35 (documenting mid-1970s insurance crisis).
Travelers, Wassau, Hartford, and other major insurance underwriters abandoned the mal-
practice insurance underwriting business when claims and rates skyrocketed. Id. at 9. By 1975
the number of insurance carriers writing medical malpractice insurance had dropped from 85
to 5. See Oregon Medical Ass'n v. Rawls, No. 421-496, slip op. at 1 (Ore. Cir. Ct. May 4,
1976) (documenting decrease in malpractice insurance carriers), rev'd on other grounds, 276
Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664 (1976).
3. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.353 (West 1975) (limiting health care providers'
liability by abrogating Collateral Source Rule); IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (Supp. 1975) (same);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1975) (same); see Robinson, supra note 1, at
5-6 (documenting legislative reaction to increasing insurance rates in 1970s). News coverage of
physicians striking to express dissatisfaction with rising medical malpractice insurance rates
and hospital administrators expressing anxiety over such rates in 1975 alerted the public to the
medical malpractice insurance "crisis." See Learner, supra note 1, at 143 (documenting visible
signs of health care providers discontent with insurance rates in mid-1970s). Criticism of state
legislatures' reactions to the medical malpractice insurance "crisis" has developed since the
deluge of medical malpractice tort reform legislation in the 1970s. See Robinson, supra note
1, at 27 (admonishing state legislatures for responding improperly to rising medical malpractice
insurance costs in 1970s). The criticism specifically accuses legislators of appearing to respond
to the medical malpractice crisis when, actually, the legislators enacted ineffective tort reform
measures. Id. An example of inconsequential legislative relief to the perceived medical mal-
practice insurance crisis is that a significant portion of the medical malpractice tort reform
legislation comprised a codification, not a modification, of common law. Compare FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.43(a)(3) (West 1985) (defining professional standard of care for health care provider
as that level of care, skill, and treatment which is acceptable and appropriate to reasonably
prudent similar health care providers); with Brooks v. Serrano, 209 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. Dist.
[Vol. 44:13031304
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abrogating the Collateral Source Rule, legislatures attempted to lower dam-
age awards in medical malpractice litigation and thus induce insurance
companies to provide malpractice insurance at lower prices. 4 The Collateral
Source Rule requires a tortfeasor to pay a full damage award to a tort
victim without deducting from the damage award any payments the tort
victim may have received from sources independent of the tortfeasor.
5
Specifically, the Collateral Source Rule permits tort victims to receive third
party compensation, such as insurance payments, social security benefits,
disability payments, workmen's compensation, and gratuitous payments in
addition to a full damage award from the tortfeasor.6 Thus, the Collateral
Source Rule ensures that a wrongdoer will pay in full for the wrongdoer's
tortious act.
7
Ct. App. 1968) (physician's duty to treat and diagnose patient is to use ordinary skills, means,
and methods as necessarily and customarily followed in physician's community or similar
community); compare FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.43(a)(3) (West 1985) (providing health care
provider to testify as expert witness if witness is health care provider similar to defendant and
possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide expert testimony on standard
of care); with Mitchell v. Angelo, 416 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (witness
qualified to testify as expert must be health care provider similar to defendant or possesses
sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide expert testimony on standard of
care).
4. See Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 338 (D. Kan. 1986) (recognizing
legislature's reasoning that lower damage awards conceivably could result in lower insurance
premiums); Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30, 37 (D. Kan. 1981) (determining that legislative
intent is to keep down medical malpractice insurance costs by limiting size of medical
malpractice verdicts); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Iowa
1980) (inferring that Iowa legislature's purpose in enacting medical malpractice legislation was
to reduce malpractice insurance premiums by reducing malpractice verdicts).
5. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 672 (Alaska 1967) (disallowing mitigation of
damages by plaintiff's disability retirement pay); De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal.2d 217, __, 444
P.2d 342, 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1968) (refusing to allow evidence of workmen's
compensation death benefits settlement to reduce damages payable by tortfeasor); McCullough
v. Ward Trucking Co., 368 Mich. 108, -, 117 N.W.2d 167, 172 (1962) (jury should have
no knowledge of plaintiff's workmen's compensation insurance); Ring v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
176 Minn. 377, -, 223 N.W. 619, 621 (1929) (jury should not consider plaintiff's receipt
of pension in determining damages); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 206, 173 N.E.2d 777,
778, 213 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (1961) (disallowing defendant's evidence of plaintiff's receipt of
pension payments); Rigney v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 99 Ohio App. 105, -, 131 N.E.2d 413,
417 (1954) (denying defendant's motion to admit evidence of employer's payment to plaintiff
and employer's subsequent credit to plaintiff's accumulated sick leave); Oddo v. Cardi, 100
R.I. 578, -, 218 A.2d 373, 375 (1966) (barring defendant from deducting gratuitous medical
services from damage award); Phillips v. Bennett, 21 Utah 2d 1, -, 439 P.2d 457, 458
(1968) (denying defendant's request to admit evidence of plaintiff's receipt of Blue Cross-Blue
Shield insurance benefits); Burks v. Webb, 199 Va. 296, 304, 99 S.E.2d 629, 636 (1957)
(negligent defendant owes full compensation for injuries inflicted on plaintiff and cannot
reduce recoverable damages by amount of insurance policy proceeds); Stone v. City of Seattle,
64 Wash. 2d 166, -, 391 P.2d 179, 183 (1964) (jury instruction properly informed jury to
disregard plaintiff's social security payments in calculating damages); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTS § 920A (1979) (defiing Collateral Source Rule).
6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing scope of Collateral Source Rule).
7. See Grayson v. Wilkins, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958) (suggesting underlying
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Medical malpractice tort victims contesting legislation that has abolished
the Collateral Source Rule have argued that the legislation violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution either because the legislation classifies the medical malpractice tort
victim differently from other tort victims, or because the legislation classifies
the physician liable for medical malpractice differently from other tortfea-
sors.8 The medical malpractice tort victims claim that denying the Collateral
notion of Collateral Source Rule that tortfeasor should be fully accountable for all harm
tortfeasor caused);, Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77
HARV. L. REv. 741, 742 (1964) (Collateral Source Rule permits plaintiff to exceed compensatory
limits to insure an impact on defendant). The Collateral Source Rule presents the issue of
whether a party at fault should pay less than the damages the party caused, or whether the
innocent party should receive a windfall. McDowell, The Collateral Source Rule-The American
Medical Association and Tort Reform, 24 WAsHimtrN L.J. 205, 208 (1985). The Collateral
Source Rule ensures that any windfall resulting from double recovery accrues to the innocent
party. Id. Currently, by allowing plaintiffs to recover from independent sources as well as
from defendants, courts have attempted to resolve a basic conflict between two principles of
tort law. Moceri & Messina, Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Litigation, 7 GONZ. L.
REv. 310, 310 (1972). One principle of tort law is to limit compensation to the amount
necessary to make the injured party whole. Id. Another principle of tort law is to avoid a
windfall to the wrongdoer if a choice must be made between the wrongdoer and the injured
party concerning which party will receive the windfall. Id.; see McDowell, supra, at 207-08
(court must decide between two conflicting principles of tort law); Schwartz, The Collateral
Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 348, 349-50 (1961) (Collateral Source Rule illustrates penal aspect
of tort damages); Note, supra, at 741 (acknowledging objective in tort law of burdening
tortfeasor with any loss).
The Collateral Source Rule is analogous to a wrongful death claim. See Schwartz, supra,
at 352 (noting similarities between Collateral Source Rule and wrongful death claim). In a
wrongful death action, the beneficiaries of a deceased person allege that the decedent's death
is attributable to the willful or negligent act of another. See Barragan v. Superior Court of
Pima County, 12 Ariz. 402, -, 470 P.2d 722, 724 (1970) (defining wrongful death action).
In wrongful death actions courts have held that the remarriage of a beneficiary does not
diminish damages payable to the beneficiary. See City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1930) (denying mitigation of widow's damages because of widow's remarriage); Schwartz,
supra, at 352 (discussing impact of remarriage on wrongful death claim). For example, courts
generally will not reduce the amount of damages for which the tortfeasor is liable if the widow
remarries after the wrongful death action accrues. See United States v. S.S. Washington, 172
F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Va. 1959) (widow's remarriage does not diminish damages defendant
must pay); Duffy v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 2d 1015, 1019, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1009
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (refusing to consider widow's remarriage in computing damages).
Similarly, compensation from collateral sources should not diminish damages payable by the
tortfeasor. See Schwartz, supra, at 352 (suggesting similar treatment to beneficiaries in wrongful
death actions and tort victims collateral payments). If a tort victim marries after the tort
victim's injury and before the trial, the damages payable by the defendant will not change.
Id. A distinguishing factor of the wrongful death analogy is that certain states have enacted
statutes characterizing a recovery from a wrongful death action as penal damages. Id.; MAss.
GEN. L. ch. 229, §§ I-6E (1983) (assessing damages according to degree of tortfeasor's
culpability); cf. infra note 21 and accompanying text (suggesting that penal damages rather
than compensatory damages more accurately punish tortfeasors for wrongful conduct).
8. See, e.g., Baker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330, 331 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(plaintiff claiming that medical malpractice legislation unreasonably classifies physicians guilty
of medical malpractice differently than other tortfeasors); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,
[Vol. 44:13031306
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Source Rule to the class of medical malpractice tort victims results in lower
awards to malpractice tort victims and that all other tort victims continue
to receive larger awards because the Collateral Source Rule still applies.9
Under an equal protection challenge, a court will identify the standard of
review appropriate for a legislative classification and apply the standard of
review to the classification. 0 Because courts have disagreed on the appro-
priate standard of review for classifications that medical malpractice legis-
lation has created, the equal protection challenges to such legislation have
produced varying and inconsistent results." To alleviate the confusion that
exists concerning the applicable standard of review in equal protection
challenges to medical malpractice legislation that abolishes the Collateral
Source Rule, courts should implement the rational basis test under the
traditional equal protection analysis that the United States Supreme Court
has reserved for economic and social legislation.'
2
The Collateral Source Rule derives from nineteenth century common
law. 3 Courts have applied the rule as both a procedural rule of evidence
-, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (1977) (plaintiffs contending that Arizona medical malpractice
legislation arbitrarily precludes medical malpractice tort victims from recovering expenses that
all other tort victims could recover); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, __
, 695 P.2d 665, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, -(1985) (plaintiff contending that medical
malpractice legislation discriminates impermissibly between medical malpractice tort victims
and other tort victims). See generally Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis of the '80s: Professional
Liability Tort Reform, 13 LEGAL AsPECTs OF MEDICAL PRAc., Dec. 1985, at 2 (discussing
medical malpractice tort victims' classification arguments in equal protection challenges to
medical malpractice legislation abolishing Collateral Source Rule). The collateral source tort
reform legislation treats medical malpractice tort victims differently than all other tort victims.
Id. (malpractice reform measures apply only in medical liability cases); infra note 25 (citing
state statutes that classify medical malpractice tort victims as distinct from other tort victims).
Plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of the reform measures have argued that the
legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution because the legislation limits the damages that a malpractice tort victim
can recover, but provides no similar limitations to plaintiffs in other lawsuits. See Hirsh,
supra, at 2 (presenting medical malpractice tort victims' equal protection argument). The
classifications resulting from medical malpractice legislation segregate victims of medical
malpractice torts from all nonmedical malpractice tort victims. Id. Classifying malpractice tort
victims raises the issue of whether tort reform legislation can withstand constitutional attack
under an equal protection analysis. Id.
9. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, -, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (1977) (plaintiffs
noting discrepancy in size of recovery between medical malpractice tort victims' awards and
other tort victims' awards).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50 (discussing importance of determining
standard of review in fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges).
11. Compare infra text accompanying notes 57-94 (discussing cases applying rational
basis test and upholding medical malpractice legislation); with infra text accompanying notes
95-135 (discussing cases applying intermediate test and striking down legislation).
12. See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text (supporting notion that rational basis
test is appropriate test for medical malpractice legislation abrogating Collateral Source Rule).
13. McDowell, supra note 7, at 205. Courts have applied the Collateral Source Rule for
at least 100 years. Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 310. In 1860 the court in Althorfe v.
Wolfe used the Collateral Source Rule to refuse to reduce damages in a widow's wrongful
19871 1307
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to prevent the admission of collateral benefits as evidence at trial and as a
substantive rule of law to prohibit a court or a jury from considering the
value of collateral benefits in determining damages. 4 An injured party can
receive collateral benefits from various sources including insurance proceeds,
gratuitous services, and pension or retirement benefits. 15 Generally, defend-
ants may not introduce evidence of any proceeds that the plaintiff may
have received from life, accident, or hospitalization insurance. 16 In addition,
a majority of jurisdictions apply the Collateral Source Rule to an injured
party's receipt of gratuities.
1 7
death action by the amount of the husband's life insurance proceeds. See Schwartz, supra
note 7 at 352 (discussing Althorfe v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355, -, N.E. -, (1860)).
14. See McDowell, supra note 7, at 205 (acknowledging Collateral Source Rule as
substantive law and evidentiary rule); Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 310 (noting dual
application of Collateral Source Rule as damages rule and evidentiary rule). A defendant often
will attempt to introduce evidence of collateral payments for a purpose other than to reduce
the damage award. See Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 324 (examining admissibility for
limited purpose of evidence of collateral payments). The arguments to admit evidence of
collateral payments for a limited purpose have resulted, in a tripartite split of authority. See
id. (noting judicial incongruity on use of evidence of collateral payments for limited purpose).
In the first line of authority, courts have permitted a defendant to admit evidence of collateral
payments for a particular purpose and have instructed the jury to consider the payments only
in commection with the particular purpose. See Fleming v. Mulligan, 3 Wash. App. 951, -,
478 P.2d 754, 756 (1970) (allowing evidence of collateral payments for limited purpose of
testing plaintiff's accuracy concerning time plaintiff was absent from work); Moceri & Messina,
supra note 7, at 324 (noting that some courts admit evidence of collateral payments for limited
purpose). The second line of authority excludes the evidence as prejudicial to the plaintiff.
See Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963) (holding that lower courts erred
in admitting evidence of collateral payments for limited purpose of showing plaintiff's motive);
Caughman v. Washington Terminal Co., 345 F.2d 434, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (finding prejudicial
error in district court's admitting evidence of collateral payments to show plaintiff's intent to
malinger); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 206-08, 173 N.e.2d 777, 779, -N.Y.S.2d -,
__(1961) (finding prejudicial effect of evidence of collateral payments strongly outweighed
any probative value); Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 324 (noting that some courts exclude
evidence of collateral payments as prejudicial). The third line of authority permits a defendant
to admit the evidence for a particular purpose only upon a strong showing that the probative
value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the plaintiff. See
Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 732-33, 484 P.2d 599, 604, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628
(1971) (allowing evidence of collateral payments for limited purpose only upon persuasive
showing that evidence has substantial probative value); Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at
324 (noting that some courts allow evidence upon showing that evidence has substantial
probative value).
15. See Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 312 (identifying possible sources of collateral
benefits).
16. See, e.g., Roth v. Chatlos, 96 Conn. 282, -, 116 A. 332, 334 (1922) (evidence
of plaintiff's accident insurance is inadmissible); Conley v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1960) (evidence of plaintiffs hospitalization insurance is inadmissible); Gaydos v.
Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, -, 152 A. 549, 553 (1930) (evidence of plaintiff's life insurance is
inadmissible).
17. See Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 313 (observing that some courts have held
that plaintiffs recovery included value of gratuities). Gratuitous payments do not involve any
outlay or expense by the tort victim. See id. at 312 (explaining nature of gratuitous payments);
[Vol. 44:13031308
COLLA TERAL SOURCE RULE
Courts have offered several justifications for applying the Collateral
Source Rule. 8 The most often cited justification supports the fault concept
in tort law.' 9 The fault concept in tort law provides that a wrongdoer should
Note, supra note 7, at 746 (nature of gratuitous service is that plaintiff incurs no expense).
By contrast to gratuitous payments, other kinds of collateral benefits require a tort victim to
incure some cost to receive these other kinds of collateral benefits. See Moceri & Messina,
supra note 7, at 312 (contrasting nature of gratuitous payment with other forms of collateral
compensation). For example, an injured party must purchase insurance to receive insurance
benefits. Id. Similarly, an injured party must take a concession in wages to receive benefits
from work-related compensation plans such as disability payments or workmen's compensation.
Id. Because a plaintiff incurs no expense for a gratuitous payment, but incurs some expense
for other collateral benefits, some courts have deducted the value of a gratuitous payment
from the damage award. See Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 374-75, 183 N.E.2d 891,
891-92, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2-3 (1962) (court deducted from plaintiff's recovery value of gratuitous
medical payments). But see Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, -, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950)
(court did not deduct value of gratuitous medical payments from plaintiff's damage award).
See generally Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 312-13 (some courts treat gratuitous payments
differently than other collateral payments). Subtracting the value of gratuitous payments fron
a plaintiff's damage award might frustrate the intent of the donor. See id. at 313 (excluding
gratuitous payments from plaintiff's recovery conflicts with donor's intent because donor of
gratuitous payment intends to help injured party not wrongdoer). Thus, if a court does not
apply the Collateral Source Rule and excludes the value of the gratuitous payment from
plaintiff's recovery, the tortfeasor, not the injured party, becomes the true beneficiary of the
gratuitous payment. See Lambert, A Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 524 INs. L. J. 531,
543 (1966) (donor did not intend to benefit wrongdoer); Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at
313 (wrongdoer benefits from gratuitous payment if plaintiff's award excludes value of
gratuitous payment); Note, supra note 7, at 751 (donor intended to confer benefit on plaintiff
and mitigation of damages would shift benefit to tortfeasor). The donor's intent, however,
might not be the appropriate basis for determining the applicability of the Collateral Source
Rule in excluding gratuitous payments from the damage award. See Lorentzen & Rankin, The
Collateral Source Issue: Forging a Middle Ground, 35 FED'N oF INs. CoUNs. Q. 3, 9 (1984)
(donor's intent is unimportant in determining applicability of Collateral Source Rule). In
addition, the donor would give the gift without considering the donee injured party's chances
of recovery from the tortfeasor. See id. at 9 (donor provides gratuity without regard for the
injured party's legal recourse against wrongdoer). Finally, not excluding gratuitous payments
from damage awards would allow the injured party to recover for losses the party has not
incurred instead of receiving compensation only for actual losses. See id. at 10 (recovery in
tort should compensate injured party for actual losses, not for losses injured party has not
suffered); Lambert, supra, at 544 (Collateral Source Rule allows plaintiff to use third party's
generosity to profit from losses not incurred).
18. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for Collateral
Source Rule). Commentators generally have agreed that the Collateral Source Rule has not
evolved with the tort system and, accordingly, that the Collateral Source Rule is obsolete. See,
e.g., K=ON & O'CoNIu., BAsic PROTECTION FOR =aH TRAFsrc VcmTm 123-54 (1967) (rec-
ommending total abolition of Collateral Source Rule); Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule
and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAUF. L. R-v. 1478, 1544 (1966) (advocating elimination
of Collateral Source Rule); McDowell, supra note 7, at 205-26 (criticizing Collateral Source
Rule); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 363 (proposing elimination of Collateral Source Rule); Note,
supra note 7, at 753 (objecting to Collateral Source Rule because Collateral Source Rule does
not mitigate damages). But see Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 327-28 (describing Collateral
Source Rule as fair and reasonable, and advocating universal application of Collateral Source
Rule).
19. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, -, 570 P.2d 744, 745 (1977) (noting
1987] 1309
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be responsible for all damages that result from the wrongdoer's actions. 20
The fault concept justification for the Collateral Source Rule is that reducing
a plaintiff's recovery by the sum of the collateral payments would weaken
the deterrent effect of damage awards on tortious activity.2' Another jus-
tification is that a defendant tortfeasor should not benefit from a plaintiff's
foresight in securing insurance.22 A third justification for applying the
Collateral Source Rule is that a plaintiff who receives insurance or other
collateral benefits should not receive a lower award than a plaintiff who is
not the recipient of any collateral benefits.? A fourth justification for the
deterrent impact of tort actions as one rationale for Collateral Source Rule); infra notes 20-
21 and accompanying text (discussing fault concept in tort law).
20. See McDowell, supra note 7, at 226 (basis of Collateral Source Rule is notion that
wrongdoer should pay for harm wrongdoer creates); id. at 211-13, 226 (tort system should
make injured party whole). Commentators have recognized an inconsistency between the
Collateral Source Rule and the tort system. Id. at 211. As the tort system evolves from a
fault-based system to a compensation-based system, the Collateral Source Rule remains firmly
grounded in the fault principle. Id. Worker's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance
exemplify the movement toward a system concerned with compensation rather than fault. Id.
at 211 n. 17. The Collateral Source Rule provides a striking contrast between a fault-based
system and a compensation-based system because the Collateral Source Rule exemplifies the
fault-based notion that the defendant should pay for all of the harm the defendant caused
even if other sources have contributed to fully compensate the plaintiff. Id. at 211.
21. See Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 312 (Collateral Source Rule has deterrent
effect in personal injury judgments); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L. J. 1417, 1447 (policy to deter tortious behavior
is most common justification for Collateral Source Rule). But see Note, supra note 7, at 748
(disagreeing with punitive function of Collateral Source Rule). The Collateral Source Rule
might not have a deterrent effect if no correlation exists between the actual harm that the
wrongdoer's action caused and the wrongdoer's degree of fault. Note, supra note 7, at 748.
A wrongdoer's liability depends on the harm the wrongdoer causes, not on the wrongdoer's
degree of fault. Id. at 749. For example, although an intentional tort may result in no damage,
an unintentional tort may cause severe damages. Id. Punitive damages are a more effective
device than compensatory damages for penalizing the wrongdoer because punitive damages do
not depend on the fortuitous circumstances on which actual damages depend. See id. (rec-
ommending punitive damages rather than compensatory damages to punish tortfeasor); Lor-
entzen & Rankin, supra note 17, at 6 (punitive damages punish more effectively than actual
damages). In addition, the Collateral Source Rule might not have a significant deterrent effect
because the insurer, not the defendant, is the party ultimately responsible to pay damages.
Lorentzen & Rankin, supra note 17, at 5. An insurance company will respond to damages
that the Collateral Source Rule has inflated by passing on the cost to the premium paying
public with an insurance premium increase. Id.
22. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, -, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (1977) (acknowl-
edging that defendant should not benefit from plaintiff's foresight in buying insurance as one
rationale for Collateral Source Rule); Perrot v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 47, 56 (1868) (plaintiff
receives insurance proceeds from contractual agreement to which defendant is not privy and,
therefore, defendant should derive no benefit); Moceri & Messina, supra note 7, at 315 (policy
argument for applying Collateral Source Rule to insurance proceeds is that foresight of insured
party should not benefit wrongdoer).
23. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, -, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (1977) (one
rationale for Collateral Source Rule is that plaintiff's purchase of insurance should not penalize
plaintiff); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Iowa 1980)




Collateral Source Rule is that the portion of the award comprising recovery
from collateral sources will offset legal fees, and the net recovery will make
the injured party whole. 24
Despite reasons for retaining the Collateral Source Rule, the rapid rise
of malpractice insurance in the mid-1970s prompted state legislatures to
examine the feasibility of the continued application of the Collateral Source
Rule and, particularly, the Collateral Source Rule's inflationary effect on
medical malpractice verdicts. 25 Accordingly, in the last ten years, many state
24. See McDowell, supra note 7, at 213 (Collateral Source Rule ensures that plaintiff
will not receive less than amount necessary to make plaintiff whole). A plaintiffs attorney
often works on a contingency basis. See id. (plaintiff pays attorney percentage of plaintiff's
recovery). The plaintiffs attorney's fees typically range from 1/3 to 1/2 of the judgment. Id.
As a result of the contingency fee arrangement, the plaintiffs award diminishes significantly.
See Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (recognizing substantial reduction
in plaintiff's recovery due to attorney's fees); McDowell, supra note 7, at 213 (noting
diminishing effect of contingency fee to plaintiffs judgment and Collateral Source Rule's
ability to ensure adequate judgment to satisfy attorney's percentage fee and plaintiff's full
compensation). But see McDowell, supra note 7, at 213 (claiming that larger damage award
resulting from Collateral Source Rule harms plaintiff by increasing base used to calculate
attorney's fees); Note, supra note 7, at 750 (jury considers attorney's fees in calculating award).
25. See Learner, supra note 1, at 146 (hoping to alleviate crisis, legislatures adopted
reform measures despite lack of statistical information as guide); Robinson, supra note 1, at
7 (noting legislative reaction to increased malpractice insurance premiums); supra note 26
(discussing statutes resulting from legislative attention to rising medical malpractice insurance
rates). Each state adopted a different tort reform scheme. Learner, supra note 1, at 146.
Typically, a state's tort reform included provisions for screening panels, a shortened statute
of limitations, caps on awards, and abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule. See id. (specifying
provisions of malpractice reform legislation).
Legislative reform directed at malpractice generally has one of two objectives. See
Robinson, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing objectives of medical malpractice legislation). First,
the legislation can focus on discouraging the initiation of claims. Id. For example, some
legislation provides for a shorter statute of limitations in malpractice claims than in other tort
claims. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (1984) (fixing statute of limitations to two
years from injury, unless injury could not have been discovered within two years, in which
case three years from injury); IND. CODE AN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns 1983) (fixing statute of
limitations to two years from injury); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(4) (1985) (fixing
statute of limitations to two years from discontinuation of treatment or six months from
discovery); see also Robinson, supra note 1, at 21 (anticipating shorter statute of limitations
to curtail claim frequency). Another example of legislation aimed at discouraging claims
involves regulating lawyers' contingent fees. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982) (upon
either party's request, court will determine reasonableness of attorneys' fees); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 6865 (1984) (limiting attorneys' fees to 35% on first $100,000 damages, 25% on
second $100,000 damages, and 10% on remaining damages); see also Robinson, supra note 1,
at 21 (discussing legislative regulation of lawyers' contingent fees). By controlling attorneys'
fees either through judicial determination of reasonable fees or by statutorily prescribed limits
on the percentage of the judgment a lawyer could claim, legislatures intended to discourage
lawyers from bringing unwarranted lawsuits and from asking for unrealistic damages. See
Robinson, supra note 1, at 22 (contingent fee regulation protects defendants and defendants'
insurers against medical malpractice lawsuits). A third example of legislation intended to
discourage litigation is eliminating the ad damnum clause from medical malpractice complaints.
See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(b) (1984) (prohibiting ad damnum clauses);
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legislatures have modified the Collateral Source Rule in medical malpractice
actions. 26 Although collateral source reform varies substantively among
states, the legislation eliminating the Collateral Source Rule shares two
attributes.27 First, the statutes apply only to medical malpractice actions
and, second, the statutes permit the defendant to introduce some evidence
of collateral benefits that the plaintiff has received.? In addition, the
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60C (West 1985) (eliminating ad damnum clauses from
medical malpractice complaints); Robinson, supra note 1, at 23 (eliminating damages clause
facilitates legislative objective of reducing lawsuit frequency). The rationale for prohibiting the
damages clause from medical malpractice complaints is to discourage filing claims resulting
from the publicity surrounding large damage claim clauses. Robinson, supra note 1, at 23.
The second classification of malpractice legislation affects the amount recoverable in a
malpractice tort claim. Id. at 21. One example of legislation that limits the amount that a
plaintiff can recover is creating screening panels as a prerequisite to trial. See e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2603 (Supp. 1975) (party may submit claim before screening panel upon party's
request); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.133(6) (West 1975) (authorizing civil discovery for screening
panel); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1975) (requiring parties to submit malpractice
claims before screening panel); Robinson, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing screening panels as
means of limiting amount recoverable in medical malpractice litigation). The function of the
screening panel varies among states, but medical and legal experts typically form the screening
panel and review the evidence in the case. See P. CARLIN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRAY
SCREENING PAiEs: A Rnvmw oF =~ EvIDENCE 15-41 (1980) (reviewing different screening
panel schemes). Another legislative device that limits a plaintiff's recovery involves a statutory
ceiling on amounts recoverable in medical malpractice actions. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333.2(b)
(West 1985) (limiting pain and suffering damages and other noneconomic losses to $250,000);
VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-581.15 (1984) (total recovery limit of $1,000,000); Robinson, supra note
1, at 25 (discussing limit on amount recoverable as partial cure for medical malpractice crisis).
Modifying the Collateral Source Rule is another legislative device intended to lower recoverable
damages. See supra note 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing legislation modifying Collateral
Source Rule). A final legislative reform intended to reduce awards allows for periodic payments
in lieu of lump-sum awards. See e.g., CAL. CIrv. PRoc. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980) (providing
for periodic payments instead of lump sum award at either plaintiff or defendant's request);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 3-2A-08(b) (1984) (providing for periodic payments at
claimant's request); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980) (providing for mandatory periodic
payments for judgments exceeding $25,000); Robinson, supra note 1, at 26 (discussing legislation
providing form periodic payments instead of lump sum award). A rationale for periodic
payments of an award instead of one lump sum payment is that the periodic payment provision
lowers the cost of the damage award to the defendant by allowing the defendant or the
defendant's insurer to invest unpaid damages and to cease payments upon the death of the
injured party. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga,
Inc., 36 Cal.3d 359, 374, 683 P.2d 670, 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 680 (1984) (discussing
rationale of periodic payment legislation); Robinson, supra note 1, at 26 (noting defendant's
preference for periodic payments instead of lump sum payment).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE Ar. tit. 18, § 6862 (1974) (abrogating Collateral Source Rule);
IDAHO CODE § 39-4210 (1977) (modifying Collateral Source Rule); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R.
4010 (1977) (abrogating Collateral Source Rule). See generally Robinson, supra note 1, at 32
(modifying or abolishing Collateral Source Rule is most common reform in medical malpractice
legislation). One commentator attributes the widespread abrogation of the Collateral Source
Rule to the perception that the abrogation only minimally alters the tort system. McDowell,
supra note 7, at 216.
27. See McDowell, supra note 7, at 216 (observing similarities among state legislation




legislation modifying the Collateral Source Rule embodies one of two
approaches to allowing evidence of collateral benefits at trial.2 9 A statute
modifying the Collateral Source Rule either gives the judge or jury the
discretion to consider the plaintiff's collateral benefits in determining dam-
ages or mandates an offset of collateral benefits against a damage award
in a medical malpractice case.30
Whether the collateral source legislation permits a court or a jury to
decide the impact of collateral benefits on a damage award or mandates
offsetting collateral payments against a damage award, available results
indicate that the collateral source legislation has reduced the severity and
frequency of damage awards in medical malpractice cases.3 The true impact
of the tort reform legislation abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, however,
largely remains undetermined.3" Only a decade has passed since the legislative
enactments, and data documenting the effect of the legislation is scarce. 3
Another explanation for the lack of information on the effect of the medical
malpractice reform legislation is that some insurers have not relied on the
legislation in determining their insurance rates. 34 The insurers have been
29. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing two formulations of Collateral
Source Rule).
30. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing alternative forms of collateral source
legislation). Nine states adopted a form of the Collateral Source Rule allowing a finder of
fact discretion in considering a plaintiff's collateral benefits. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §
3333.1 (West 1985) (allowing jury to decide whether to consider collateral benefits in determining
damages award); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1984) (permitting jury to decide whether to
exclude certain collateral benefits from damage award); N.Y. Crv. PAC. LAw §4010 (McKinney
1984) (allowing jury to determine whether to exclude collateral benefits from damage award);
S.D. CODInuD LAws ANN. § 21-3-12 (1984) (permitting jury discretion regarding treatment of
gratuitous collateral benefits); Hirsh, supra note 8, at 5 (citing number of states that have
adopted discretionary form of legislation abrogating the Collateral Source Rule). Ten states
adopted the form mandating an offset of a plaintiff's collateral benefits against the award.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West 1985) (requiring offset of collateral payments
against damage award); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Baldwin 1984) (requiring offset of
collateral payments other than collateral payments that employer or claimant paid for); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34 (1984) (requiring offset of collateral payments against damage award);
see Hirsh, supra note 8, at 5 (citing number of states that have adopted mandatory form of
legislation abrogating Collateral Source Rule); see also Danzon, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing
contradictory statistics on effect of mandatory offset versus discretionary offset).
31. See Danzon, supra note 1, at 77 (collateral source legislation resulted in 11% to
18% reduction in severity of individual awards); id. at 72 (collateral source legislation resulted
in 14% reduction in claim frequency). "Severity" refers to the size of the award per paid
claim and "frequency" refers to the number of claims filed. Id. at 57. The change in the
Collateral Source Rule purportedly is one of the most effective methods of tort reform for
reducing the size of jury awards and settlements. See Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis of the 80's-
Did the Reforms Help?, 14 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PPAc., Jan. 1986 at 4 (noting
effectiveness of legislation modifying Collateral Source Rule).
32. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 27 (noting unavailability of accurate data on legal
reforms of 1970s).
33. Id.
34. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing insurers' reluctance to rely on
medical malpractice legislation).
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reluctant to rely on laws that courts might strike down as unconstitutional. 5
The decisions striking down medical malpractice legislation as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution support the insurers' doubts regarding the constitutionality of
the medical malpractice legislation
6
The disparity among courts regarding the standard of review for medical
malpractice legislation modifying the Collateral Source Rule raises the
question of which standard of review courts should apply. In considering
equal protection challenges to medical malpractice legislation, state and
federal courts have relied, in varying degrees, on the guidelines that the
United States Supreme Court has provided in cases considering challenges
to the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.17 The Supreme Court has not interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment to require absolute equality or similar
treatment of things different in fact.38 Instead, the Supreme Court has
developed the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to
ensure that those similarly situated receive similar treatment. 9 To determine
whether a legislative classification complies with the right to equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has developed a model
35. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 2 (predicting how courts will decide equal protection
challenges to medical malpractice legislation is virtually impossible); Redish, Legislative Re-
sponse to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L.
REv. 759, 762 (1977) (insurers await outcome of constitutional challenges before lowering rates
in reliance on statutes); Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An
Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829, 858 (1979) (supporting reasonableness
of insurers' fear that court will strike down medical malpractice legislation); see also Hirsh,
supra note 8, at 2 (malpractice tort reform, viewed as one-sided and unfair "special legislation"
because of benefits to physicians, is unlikely to survive).
36. See, e.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 997 (D. Kan. 1985) (striking down
medical malpractice legislation abrogating Collateral Source Rule); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, -, 555 P.2d 399, 416 (1976) (striking down medical malpractice
legislation as violating Equal Protection Clause of fourteenth amendment of United States
Constitution), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316,
- 343 N.E.2d 832, 837 (1976) (striking down medical malpractice legislation as unconsti-
tutional).
37. See e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 204-08 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny test);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-210 (1976) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961) (applying rational basis standard of
review).
38. See Tussman & tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAns. L. REv. 341,
343-44 (1949) (explaining concept of constitutional equal protection). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
39. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (function of Equal Protection Clause
of fourteenth amendment to United States Constitution is to provide similar treatment to
similarly situated persons); Tignor v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (defining constitutional
meaning of equal protection); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 2 (Equal Protection Clause);




for examining a legislative purpose and the means of attaining that purpose. 0
In traditional equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court has constructed
a two-tiered standard of review comprised of strict scrutiny and rational
basis tests. 41 Courts have applied the rigid test of strict scrutiny to legislative
classifications that either concern suspect classes, such as race, alienage, or
national origin, or infringe fundamental interests, such as the rights to
privacy, interstate travel, and marriage and procreation. 42 Courts applying
the two-tiered standard of review historically have upheld legislation under
the strict scrutiny test only if the legislature precisely has tailored the
40. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIAiS ON CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW 657-897 (9th ed.
1975) (describing framework for equal protection analysis); supra note 37 (noting cases
representing three levels of equal protection analysis that United States Supreme Court has
developed); infra text accompanying notes 41-50 (discussing strict scrutiny, rational basis, and
intermediate scrutiny as framework for equal protection analysis).
41. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 204-08 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny standard of
review); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961) (applying rational basis test).
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("pressing public necessity"
may justify racially based restrictions). Courts apply the strict scrutiny test only when legislative
classifications threaten certain suspect classes or fundamental interests. Gunther, supra note
40, at 658. Classifications are suspect when the class is so burdened with such disabilities or
has such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or occupies such a position of political
powerlessness that the class requires extraordinary protection. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
217 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The United
States Supreme Court specifically has identified suspect classifications as the legislative classi-
fications that discriminate against classes of persons on the basis of race, alienage, or national
origin. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny
standard of review to classifications threatening alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6
(1967) (applying strict scrutiny standard of review to race-based classification); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) (classifications discriminating against national origin subject
to strict scrutiny); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-43 (1915) (classifications discriminating
against alienage subject to strict scrutiny); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)
(classifications discriminating against race subject to strict scrutiny).
In addition to applying the strict scrutiny standard of review to legislation that torments
suspect classifications, the Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny test when legislative
classifications threaten certain fundamental interests. The Supreme Court has limited the
category of fundamental rights to those that the United States Constitution explicitly or
implicitly guarantees. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973) (limiting fundamental interests to interests that United States Constitution explicitly or
implicitly guarantees). Fundamental rights that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
include interstate travel, privacy, voting in state elections, marriage and procreation, and first
amendment rights. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (fundamental
rights include first amendment rights); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 331, 362-63 (1972) (right
to vote in state elections is fundamental right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1969) (right to interstate travel is fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (fundamental rights include right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
WilUiamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental rights include right to marry and procreate).
See generally Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 695-98 (1977) (discussing development of fundamental interest
branch of strict scrutiny standard of review. But see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (refusing to recognize access to education as fundamental
interest).
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classification to serve a compelling governmental interest.43 The second
standard of review in the two-tiered approach is the rational basis test.44
Courts have reserved the rational basis test for legislation creating economic
or social classifications. 45 Under the rational basis test, a court will presume
that a contested statute is constitutional and will uphold the statute if the
court can conceive of some rational relationship to some legitimate state
purpose. 46 While few statutes survive the strict scrutiny standard of review,
few statutes fail the rational basis test.47 In addition to the traditional two-
tiered standard of review, the Supreme Court has applied a third, inter-
mediate standard of review to fourteenth amendment equal protection
challenges.48 Under an intermediate standard of review, courts will examine
whether the legislative classification bears a substantial relationship to
promoting an important governmental objective.49 The United States Su-
43. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (defining government's burden of proof
to uphold legislation under strict scrutiny standard of review). See generally Bice, supra note
42, at 699 (discussing scope of strict scrutiny equal protection analysis).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-47 (discussing rational basis test).
45. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961) (applying rational basis
test).
46. See id. (describing appropriate inquiry under rational basis test).
47. See Note, supra note 35, at 864 (determining standard of review in fourteenth
amendment equal protection challenge dictates whether legislation is constitutional). One
commentator has capsulized the strict scrutiny standard of review as strict in theory and fatal
in fact. G. GuNTmm, supra note 40, at 8. Commentators have criticized the two-tier analysis
of equal protection challenges as outcome determinative. See G. GUiTMR, supra note 40, at
657-897 (noting outcome determinative nature of traditional equal protection analysis); Note,
supra note 35, at 865 (observing that court will uphold legislation if court applies rational
basis test and will strike down legislation if court applies strict scrutiny test); Comment,
"Newer" Equal Protection: The Impact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFFALo L. REv.
665, 665 (1974) (explaining that traditional equal protection analysis is outcome determinative).
Courts applying the strict scrutiny test to contested legislation invariably strike down the
legislation, while courts applying the rational basis test to contested legislation invariably
uphold the legislation. See Note, supra note 35, at 851 (discussing outcome determinative
nature of traditional equal protection analysis).
48. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (discussing level of scrutiny under
intermediate standard of review); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-16 (1976) (applying
intermediate standard of review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (acknowledging existence of intermediate standard of review); G. GUNTHER,
supra note 40, at 665-73 (discussing intermediate standard of review); Note, supra note 35, at
893 (discussing intermediate standard of review). Some commentators question whether an
intermediate standard of review ever existed. See Redish, supra note 35, at 773 (questioning
Supreme Court's position on intermediate standard of review). Redish has observed that the
Supreme Court never has recognized explicitly a third tier to the traditional two-tiered equal
protection analysis. Id. Moreover, Redish claims that since 1971 the Supreme Court has applied
the rational basis test to virtually all equal protection cases. Id. at 774 (noting Supreme Court's
widespread application of rational basis test to equal protection challenges but explicitly
excluding cases involving gender-based classifications (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)).
49. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-210 (1976) (applying intermediate standard of
review). See generally Bice, supra note 42, at 702-07 (discussing implications of United States
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preme Court has limited the application of the intermediate standard to
classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, and the right to privacy.5 0
Uncertainty regarding which standard of review to apply to legislation
modifying the Collateral Source Rule in medical malpractice actions has
created inconsistent results in both state and federal courts.5 1 The courts
that have addressed the constitutionality of legislation abrogating the Col-
lateral Source Rule have applied either the rational basis standard of review
or the intermediate standard of review.52 With the exception of the United
States District Court of Kansas decision in Coburn v. Agustin,53 in which
the court applied a heightened rational basis standard of review, every court
ruling on the constitutionality of Collateral Source legislation since 1980
has applied the traditional rational basis test to collateral source legislation.
54
The courts applying the rational basis standard of review defer to the
Supreme Court's decision in Craig on fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis). In
Craig v. Boren the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a gender-
based classification. Craig, 190 U.S. at 197-210. The challenged Oklahoma statute prohibited
the sale of beer to males younger than 21 but permitted the sale of beer to females 18 years
of age or older. Id. at 197; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(a) (Supp. 1976). The state attempted
to show that the gender-based classification was rational by introducing statistics indicating
that males between 18 and 20 years old more likely will be arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and for drunkenness than females between 18 and 20. Craig, 190 U.S. at
200-01. The state's evidence indicated that in 1973 the state arrested 427 males for driving
under the influence and 966 males for drunkenness and, in the same year, the state arrested
24 females for driving under the influence and 102 for drunkenness. Id. at 200 n. 8. The
United States Supreme Court reasoned that the statistics did not show that the gender-based
classification bore a substantial relationship to improving traffic safety. Id. at 201.
50. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-204 (applying intermediate standard of review to classi-
fications based on gender); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-16 (1976) (applying inter-
mediate standard of review to classifications based on illegitimacy); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168-76 (1972) (classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to
intermediate standard of review); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (implying
that right to privacy is subject to intermediate standard of review); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75-77 (1971) (implying that gender-based classifications are subject to intermediate standard
of review); Redish, supra note 35, at 773 (noting Supreme Court's limited application of
intermediate standard of review).
51. Compare infra text accompanying notes 57-94 (discussing cases applying rational
basis standard of review) with infra text accompanying notes 95-135 (discussing cases applying
intermediate standard of review).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57-94 (discussing cases in which courts have
applied rational basis test to medical malpractice legislation abrogating Collateral Source Rule);
infra text accompanying notes 95-135 (discussing cases in which courts have applied intermediate
test to medical malpractice legislation abrogating Collateral Source Rule).
53. 627 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kan. 1985).
54. See, e.g., Baker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (D. Tenn. 1985)
(applying rational basis test to uphold statute abrogating Collateral Source Rule); Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, -, 695 P.2d 665, 685-86, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,
_ (1985) (applying rational basis test to uphold statute modifying Collateral Source Rule);
Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 557-59 (Iowa 1980) (applying
rational basis test to uphold statute abrogating Collateral Source Rule). See infra text accom-
panying notes 57-94 (discussing cases applying rational basis test); infra text accompanying
notes 66-73 (discussing Coburn v. Agustin).
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legislatures' identification of issues requiring statutory attention." In addi-
tion, courts invoking the rational basis standard of review recognize the
legislatures' latitude in developing a solution to a legislatively perceived
problem.
6
The most recent decision on the constitutionality of collateral source
legislation upheld the contested legislation under the rational basis test.57 In
Ferguson v. Garmon 5 the United States District Court of Kansas considered
the constitutionality of legislation that permitted health care providers to
introduce evidence of collateral payments in medical malpractice liability
actions.5 9 The plaintiff in Ferguson moved for a pre-trial determination of
the constitutionality of the Kansas statute.60 The plaintiff, Ferguson, claimed
that the defendants' negligence caused Ferguson's injuries. 61 Ferguson's
insurance paid a portion of Ferguson's medical expenses. 62 Under the Kansas
statute permitting health care providers to introduce evidence of collateral
payments in medical malpractice actions, the defendants intended to intro-
duce at trial evidence of Ferguson's receipt of insurance benefits.6 Ferguson
contended that the Kansas statute violated the equal protection clauses of
the United States and Kansas constitutions because the statute treated
medical malpractice plaintiffs differently than other tort plaintiffs.64
In determining the appropriate standard of review to apply to the equal
protection dispute in Ferguson, the Ferguson court discarded the strict
scrutiny test because the classification did not involve a suspect classification
or a fundamental right. 65 Next, the court considered whether to recognize
a heightened form of rational basis scrutiny that the United States District
Court of Kansas had adopted eleven months earlier in Coburn v. Agustin.66
55. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1976) (judiciary lacks power to question
facts legislature used in determining whether problem required legislative treatment); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (absent suspect class or fundamental interest,
court will not second guess wisdom or necessity of legislation); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (state legislatures presumptively act within authority granted under
United States Constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, -, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980)
(declining to examine factual basis for legislative justification of statute).
56. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (entitling legislature to
proceed step by step in addressing problem).
57. Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 337-42 (D. Kan. 1986).
58. Id. at 335.
59. Id, at 337-42; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-3403 (1985) (permitting health care providers
to introduce evidence of medical malpractice victim's collateral source payments).
60. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 337.
61. Id. Ferguson's injuries included substantial loss of the digestive tract. Id.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id.; see supra note 59 (noting Kansas statute abrogating Collateral Source Rule in
medical malpractice litigation).
64. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 337.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 339; see Coburn v. Agustin,'627 F. Supp. 983, 991 (D. Kan. 1985) (adopting
heightened form of rational basis scrutiny); see infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text
(discussing Coburn v. Agustin).
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The district court in Coburn adopted a fourth standard of review to equal
protection inquiries and labeled it the heightened form of rational basis
scrutiny.67 The Coburn court stated that the heightened scrutiny test required
the court to balance the significance of the personal rights affected against
the significance of the governmental interest. 68 The Ferguson court rejected
the Coburn heightened form of rational basis scrutiny and instead applied
the rational basis standard of review. 69 In choosing the rational basis
standard of review, the Ferguson court noted that the majority of the United
States circuit courts of appeals have refused to recognize the heightened
form of rational basis scrutiny and instead have applied the rational basis
test to equal protection challenges of medical malpractice legislation.70 In
addition, the Ferguson court suggested that the United States Supreme
Court impliedly affirmed the rational basis test as the appropriate review
for equal protection challenges to medical malpractice legislation when the
Supreme Court dismissed a request for appeal of a decision in which a
lower court had applied the rational basis test to a medical malpractice
statute abrogating the Collateral Source Rule.
7
1
In both Coburn and Ferguson the United States District Court of Kansas
was examining the same statute.7 2 The Coburn court struck down the Kansas
statute by applying the novel heightened form of rational basis scrutiny.73
Alternatively, the Ferguson court upheld the Kansas statute by following
appellate court decisions and applying the rational basis test.74 Federal and
67. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 995. In deciding to apply a heightened form of rational
basis scrutiny, the Coburn court refused to apply the intermediate standard of review because
the United States Supreme Court had limited use of the intermediate standard of review to
classifications based on gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. Id. at 993; see infra notes 95-135
(discussing cases applying intermediate standard of review). In determining the applicability of
the heightened form of rational basis scrutiny to the contested legislation, the Coburn court
credited the United States Supreme Court with developing the heightened scrutiny standard of
review. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 990 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105
S. Ct. 3249 (1985), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1976 (1985)).
68. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 991. The Coburn court's formulation of the strict scrutiny
standard of review included examining the importance of the rights affected, the extent to
which the statute impaired the rights affected, and the nature of the class burdened. Id.
69. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 339.
70. Id.; see Gronne v. Abrams, 793 F.2d 74, 77-79 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying rational
basis test to uphold New York statute requiring pre-trial screening of medical malpractice
claims); Montagino v. Canale, 792 F.2d 554, 556-58 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying rational basis
test to uphold Louisiana statute reducing statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims);
Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying rational basis test
to uphold California statute limiting noneconomic losses in medical malpractice actions to
$250,000).
71. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 340 (citing Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d
137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985)).
72. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 337; Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 986; see KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3403 (1985) (abrogating Collateral Source Rule in medical malpractice actions).
73. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 997.
74. Ferguson, 643 F. Supp. at 339-41; see supra note 70 (citing cases that Ferguson court
relied on as persuasive precedent).
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state courts since 1980 have applied the traditional equal protection analysis
that the United States District Court of Kansas adopted in Ferguson to
equal protection challenges. For example, in 1980 the Supreme Court of
Iowa applied the rational basis test in upholding a statute abrogating the
Collateral Source Rule. 75 In Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center76 a
hospital employee's negligence permanently disabled William Rudolph.
7
1
Rudolph and his wife brought an action for malpractice against the hospi-
tal. 78 The trial court allowed Rudolph to introduce evidence of medical bills
and salary to reflect economic loss, even though a third party had indem-
nified the Rudolphs for the loss.79 In addition, the trial court prohibited
the hospital from introducing evidence of insurance payments to Rudolph
for Rudolph's medical bills and salary during his absence from work. 0 The
trial court held that section 147.136 of the Iowa Code, which provided for
excluding the value of collateral benefits from damage awards, violated the
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the Iowa
Constitution.8' The jury delivered a judgment for the Rudolphs.12 On appeal
the Rudolph court considered whether the trial court erred in allowing
William Rudolph to recover for damages that collateral sources had paid.83
Holding that section 147.136 of the Iowa Code was constitutional, the Iowa
Supreme Court reduced William Rudolph's judgment by the value of the
collateral benefits Rudolph received.84
In upholding the constitutionality of section 147.136, the Rudolph court
determined the standard of review as the threshold inquiry g The Rudolph
court noted that the Supreme Court of Iowa historically had applied the
rational basis test unless the classification was suspect or involved funda-
mental rights.8 6 The Rudolphs argued that the statute's classification treated
75. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980).
76. Id. at 550.
77. Id. at 553. The plaintiff in Rudolph, William Rudolph, underwent an anterior cervical
fusion in the Iowa Methodist Medical Center. Id. The evidence indicated that subsequent to
the surgery, a hospital employee permitted Rudolph's head to fall backwards while transferring
Rudolph from a hospital cart to Rudolph's hospital bed. Id. No one immediately reported the
incident to Rudolph's surgeon and Rudolph became partially paralyzed soon after the operation.
Id. Rudolph's surgeon performed another procedure to alleviate the complications resulting
from the post surgical error, and although Rudolph partially recovered, he suffered some
permanent disability. Id.
78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 557.
80. Id.
81. Id.; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1, CI. 2; IowA CONST. art. 1, §6; IowA CODE ANN.
§147.136 (West 1975).
82. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 553. The jury awarded William Rudolph $553,725.88 and
awarded Rudolph's wife $30,000. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 559-60.
85. Id. at 557.
86. Id. The Rudolph court observed that with few exceptions, most courts that have
addressed the constitutionality of medical malpractice legislation have applied the rational basis
test to equal protection analyses. Id.
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victims of medical malpractice differently than victims of other torts by
denying medical malpractice victims the benefit of the Collateral Source
Rule, which other tort victims could have employed. 7 The Iowa Supreme
Court recognized that the rational basis test required the court to determine
whether the Rudolphs had met the burden of proving that the legislatively
defined classification of medical malpractice tort victims was wholly irrele-
vant to the state's objective."'
In examining the relevance of the classification of medical malpractice
tort victims to the statute abrogating the Collateral Source Rule, the Rudolph
court initially questioned whether the legislature had stated an objective
when enacting the legislation. 9 The Rudolph court noted that the Iowa
General Assembly's records indicated that the General Assembly had deter-
mined that the high cost and unavailability of medical malpractice insurance
constituted a critical situation. 90 The Rudolph court observed that the Iowa
legislature enacted section 147.136 as a temporary solution to the critical
situation. 9' The Rudolph court inferred that the legislature's reasoning in
enacting section 147.136 was that barring recovery of the value of collateral
benefits would reduce the size of malpractice verdicts. 92 The Rudolph court
found, accordingly, that medical malpractice insurance carriers would adjust
malpractice insurance premiums to reflect the lower verdicts. 9 Noting the
heavy burden on a party who challenges a statute on equal protection
grounds under the rational basis test, the Rudolph court held that the
Rudolphs had failed to meet the burden and, accordingly, upheld section
147.136.9
In contrast to the courts that have invoked the rational basis standard
of review, each court applying an intermediate level of review to equal
protection challenges to collateral source legislation has employed different
versions of the intermediate standard of review. 9 One construction of the
intermediate standard of review is a "means-focus" judicial inquiry of
whether the substance of the legislation substantially furthers the goal of
the legislation.9 For example, in Jones v. State Board of Medicine97 the
Idaho Supreme Court applied the means-focus test in considering the
87. Id. at 558; IowA CODE ANN. §147.136 (West 1975).
88. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 558; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961) (outlining scope of rational basis test).
89. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 558.
90. Id.; see 66th Iowa General Assembly, 1975 Session, ch. 239, § I (evaluating availability
and cost of medical malpractice insurance).
91. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 558; see 66th Iowa General Assembly, 1975 Session, ch.
239, § I (enacting §147.136 of Iowa Code as provisional solution to insurance unavailability).
92. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 558.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 559.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 95-135 (discussing cases applying different inter-
pretations of intermediate standard of review to equal protection challenges).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 108-16 (discussing means-focus intermediate test).
97. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
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constitutionality of Idaho's 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act (1975 Act)9"
under the United States Constitution and under the Idaho Constitution.9
A group of physicians and hospitals in Jones brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment against the State Board of Medicine and the Idaho
Department of Welfare to determine the constitutionality of the 1975 Act11°
Among other provisions, section 39-4210 of the 1975 Act limited a plaintiff's
remedies in medical malpractice actions in Idaho against physicians and
health care facilities and, specifically, limited a medical malpractice tort
victim's recovery to compensatory damages that collateral sources had not
satisfied.' 01 The plaintiffs in Jones claimed that the suspect constitutional
validity of the 1975 Act had compelled the plaintiffs to maintain malpractice
insurance in excess of the limitations prescribed by the 1975 Act and had
increased malpractice insurance rates. 02 The District Court of Idaho struck
down the portion of the 1975 Act that placed a ceiling on recoverable
damages but declined to decide the constitutionality of section 39-4210.103
The State Board of Medicine and the Department of Health and Welfare
appealed the district court's decision.? 4
On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court in part considered the constitution-
ality of the section of the 1975 Act that limited a medical malpractice
victim's recovery to compensatory damages that collateral sources did not
satisfy. 05 In determining the constitutional validity of the 1975 Act, the
Jones court examined the evolution of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment." 6 The Jones court acknowledged the traditional
two-tier equal protection analysis and, in addition, examined the newer
intermediate standard of review." 7 Instead of applying the rational basis
98. IDAHO CODE §39-4201 to 4210 (1975).
99. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 403; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 2
(Equal Protection Clause of fourteenth amendment); IDAHO CONST. art. I, §2 (equal protection
clause of Idaho Constitution).
100. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 402; IDAHO CODE §39-4201 to 4210 (1975)
(Idaho's 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act). The defendants in Jones, the State Board of
Medicine and the Department of Health and Welfare, were responsible for hospital and
physician licensing as well as general health care regulation. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555
P.2d at 403.
101. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 402; IDAHO CODE §39-4210 (limiting relief
available to medical malpractice tort victims).
102. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 402-03.
103. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 403. The District Court of Idaho struck down §39-4204
and §39-4205 of the Idaho Code as violating the Idaho Constitution. See IDAHO CODE §39-
4204 (1975) (limiting medical malpractice tort victim's recoverable damages against physicians
to $150,000 per claim and $300,000 per occurrence); id. §39-4205 (limiting medical malpractice
tort victim's recoverable damages against hospitals to $150,000 per claim and $300,000 per
occurrence or number of beds in hospital multiplied by $10,000).
104. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 402.
105. Id.; see IDAHO CODE § 39-4210 (1975) (limiting medical malpractice tort victims'
recovery to compensatory damages that collateral payments did not satisfy).
106. Jones, 97 Idaho at __ , 555 P.2d at 406-07.
107. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 406.
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test, the Jones court determined that the means-focus test was the appro-
priate test because the 1975 Act created discriminatory classifications and
because the equal protection analysis required a more stringent standard of
review for legislation that creates discriminatory classifications. 03 The Idaho
Supreme Court defined the means-focus standard of review as whether a
legislative means substantially furthers a specific legislative end.l°0 The Jones
court determined that the means-focus test applied whenever the discrimi-
natory character of legislation is apparent on the legislation's face and no
relationship exists between the classification and the legislation's express
purpose." 0 The Jones court found that applying a means-focus analysis
required an inquiry into whether the problem that the legislature had
identified, the insurance crisis, actually existed."' The Jones court main-
tained that if the court confirmed the legislative determination that an
insurance crisis existed, the court would continue its inquiry and examine
whether the classification substantially furthered the stated legislative pur-
poses of alleviating skyrocketing malpractice insurance costs and promoting
health care."
2
In applying the means-focus test to the facts in Jones, the Idaho Supreme
Court determined that the legislation created a discriminatory classification
based on the degree of injury and damage resulting from medical malprac-
tice." 3 In addition, the Jones court held that although the defendant argued
108. Id. The Supreme Court of Idaho maintained that the United States Supreme Court
had set forth the intermediate means-focus standard of review in prior cases. Id. The Jones
court examined two United States Supreme Court cases that departed from the two-tiered
analysis. Id. at 407; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (invoking more
stringent standard than rational basis test); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (applying
higher standard than rational basis test). In Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of legislation that established classifications based on gender. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 71-76 (1971). In Eisenstadt v. Baird the Supreme Court examined a legislative
classification distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children. Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 440-55 (1972). In striking down the legislation in both Reed and Eisenstadt, the
United States Supreme Court stated that to meet constitutional standards, the legislative
classification had to be reasonable and not arbitrary, and that the distinction which the
classification brought out had to have a fair and substantial relation to the aim of the
legislation. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447; Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. In examining the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Reed and Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Jones
maintained that Reed and Eisenstadt set forth a "means-focus" standard of review that
deviated from the traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis. Jones, 555 P.2d at 407. The
Jones court asserted that Reed and Eisenstadt proposed a higher standard than the rational
basis standard. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court in Jones professed to have adopted the means-
focus standard of review for certain statutes that created obviously discriminatory classifica-
tions. Id.; see Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on the Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1972) (labeling standard that Supreme
Court applied in Reed and Eisenstadt as "means-focus").
109. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 407.
110. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 411.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Jones court identified the discriminatory classification of the legislation in
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that the 1975 Act was a necessary legislative response to a medical mal-
practice crisis in Idaho, the facts on the record did not demonstrate a
crisis.114 Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court terminated the means-focus
analysis upon finding no relationship between limitations imposed on re-
coverable damages and the expressed legislative objective of promoting
health care.1 5 The Jones court remanded the case for additional evidence
supporting the existence of an insurance crisis.1 6
While some courts that apply the intermediate standard of review and
reject the rational basis analysis concede that a legislature could conclude
that health care problems require special treatment, other courts that im-
plement the intermediate standard of review have determined that the right
to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right." 7 Accord-
ingly, courts that construe the right to recover for personal injury as a
substantive right measure restrictions imposed upon substantive rights with
greater judicial scrutiny than the rational basis test."' For example, in
Carson v. Maurer 9 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered the
appropriate standard of review for an equal protection challenge under the
New Hampshire Constitution for medical malpractice legislation that, in
part, abolished the Collateral Source Rule. 20 The Carson court determined
Jones according to degree of injury and damage resulting from the medical malpractice because
the primary thrust of the issues on appeal involved the ceiling on recoverable damages imposed
by the 1975 Hospital - Medical Liability Act (1975 Act). See id. at 402 (identifying issues on
appeal). The Jones court never identified a discriminatory classification in the provision of
the 1975 Act abrogating the Collateral Source Rule. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 411.
114. Id. at _, 555 P.2d at 412.
115. Id. at , 555 P.2d at 411.
116. Id. at , 555 P.2d at 417. On remand the trial court in Jones held that the
legislation did not violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee under the
rational basis test. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, Nos. 55527, 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho 1980).
The trial court interpreted the remand order, however, to require the more rigorous "means
scrutiny" test. Id. Under the means scrutiny test, the trial court found insufficient factual
support of an insurance crisis to justify enacting the 1975 Act. Id.; see Robinson, supra note
1, at 21 n. 86 (explaining substantive and procedural history of Jones).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 95-116 (discussing cases in which courts concede
that legislature could reason that health care problems require legislative remedy); infra text
accompanying notes 119-24 (discussing cases in which courts characterize right to recover as
substantive right).
118. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, -, 424 A.2d 825, 830-831 (1980). The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Carson v. Maurer stated that the right to recover for
personal injuries was not a fundamental right, but instead characterized the right to recover
as a substantive right. Id. at 830. A fundamental right is a right that the United States Supreme
Court explicitly or implicitly guarantees. See supra note 42 (explaining concept of fundamental
rights). A substantive right is a right that the United State Constitution does not guarantee
but nonetheless construes as sufficiently important to require more rigorous judicial scrutiny
than under the rational basis test. Carson, 120 N.H. at -, 424 A.2d at 830.
119. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
120. Id. at -, 424 A.2d at 830-31. In Carson, the challenged provision of the statute
modifying the Collateral Source Rule permitted the defendant to offer evidence of the plaintiff's
compensation from collateral sources. Id. at -, 424 A.2d at 835; see N.H. REv. STAT.
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that the appropriate test was whether the legislation was a reasonable
measure that facilitated the public interest and whether the legislation had
a fair and substantial relation to the legislative purpose. 12' The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire maintained that although the United States
Supreme Court had restricted the substantial relationship test to classifica-
tions of gender and illegitimacy, the United States Constitution did not
limit the interpretation of the New Hampshire Constitution and the state
constitution could grant greater rights than the minimal guarantees of the
United States Constitution.'2 The Carson court concluded that the statute
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminated in favor of health care provi-
ders. 12 In addition, the Carson court balanced the individual's interest that
the legislation violated against society's interest that the legislation advanced
and concluded that the restriction of private rights resulting from the
legislation outweighed the benefits of the legislation to the public.
24
While some courts confine the intermediate test to the boundaries of
strict scrutiny and rational basis, other courts combine the intermediate and
strict scrutiny standards of review. For example, in Graley v. Satayatham'2
the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio considered whether a statute modifying
the Collateral Source Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause to the
ANN. § 507-C:7 I (Supp. 1979) (permitting defendant to introduce evidence of plaintiff's
compensation from collateral sources at trial). In addition, the pertinent provision provided
that the plaintiff may introduce evidence of costs incurred to secure the compensation. Carson,
120 N.H. at -, 424 A.2d at 835; see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 I (Supp. 1979)
(allowing introduction of evidence of collateral payments at trial). Finally, the statute provided
that the judge instruct the jury to reduce the award for economic loss by the difference
between the collateral benefits received and the amount the plaintiff pays to secure the benefits.
Carson, 120 N.H. at - , 424 A.2d at 835; see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 I (Supp.
1979) (instructing jury to reduce award by value of collateral payments).
121. Carson, 120 N.H. at -, 424 A.2d at 831.
122. Id. (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1979), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
123. Carson, 120 N.H. at -, 424 A.2d at 836.
124. Id. at -, 424 A.2d at 831, 836. The Carson court recognized that collateral
source legislation might promote the legislative objective of containing health care costs. Id.
at -, 424 A.2d at 836. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted, however, three
detrimental effects of the collateral source legislation to the malpractice tort victim. Id. First,
the Carson court maintained that abolishing the Collateral Source Rule would force the victim's
insurer to compensate the victim without remuneration from the tortfeasor. Id. at -, 424
A.2d at 835. Second, the Carson court found that the pertinent statute provided that if the
collateral benefits include workmen's compensation, the workmen's compensation insurance
carrier held a lien on any damages recovered by the plaintiff. Id. at -, 424 A.2d at 836.
The Carson court observed that if the Collateral Source Rule were abolished, the jury would
diminish the award by the amount of the workmen's compensation payments, and the plaintiff
would suffer again because of the workmen's compensation carrier's lien on plaintiff's damages.
Id. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire objected to the possible double deduction from
the plaintiff's award of workmen's compensation. Id. Finally, the Carson court observed that
collateral source legislation might create a windfall for the tortfeasor. Id. The court noted
that, moreover, a tort victim often suffers twice because the tort victim receives the collateral
benefits as fringe benefits for which the tort victim has paid through a concession in wages.
Id.
125. 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
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fourteenth amendment.' 26 The plaintiffs in Graley alleged medical malprac-
tice by the defendants and asked for damages resulting from the malprac-
tice. 27 The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints for plaintiffs'
failure to comply with section 2307.42 of the Ohio Code, which required
plaintiffs to disclose collateral benefits. 28 The plaintiffs contended that the
Ohio statute was constitutionally invalid under the equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.2 9 In addressing
the equal protection challenge to section 2307.42, the Graley court acknowl-
edged the concepts of strict scrutiny and rational basis as the two tests
under traditional equal protection analysis. 30 The Graley court was unable
to determine an appropriate governmental interest that the classification
furthered and, accordingly, the Graley court rejected traditional equal
protection analysis.' 3' Instead, the Graley court applied the strict scrutiny
standard of review to hold that no compelling governmental interest justified
the legislation.132 In addition, the Graley court incorporated the intermediate
test into the court's standard of review. 33 The Ohio Court of Common
Pleas claimed that unless a classification furthers a legitimate legislative
objective, the classification is intolerable. 34 Finding that no satisfactory
reason existed for the separate and unequal treatment to malpractice tort
victims, the Graley court struck down the legislation,.
35
126. Id. at __, 343 N.E.2d at 836. The statute amending the Collateral Source Rule in
Graley required the plaintiff to list in the plaintiff's complaint all collateral benefits that the
plaintiff had received. Id. at -, 343 N.E.2d at 834; see Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2307.42
(Baldwin 1975) (providing for disclosure of collateral payments in complaint). The statute also
provided for reducing the award by any collateral recovery for medical and hospital care,
custodial care, rehabilitation services, and loss of earned income. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at
- 343 N.E.2d at 835; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Baldwin 1975) (diminishing award
by value of collateral payments). The statute also expressly excluded from collateral recovery
any benefits paid under an insurance policy. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at -, 343 N.E.2d at
835; Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Baldwin 1975) (excluding insurance payments from
collateral recovery).
127. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at -, 343 N.E.2d at 833. The Ohio Court of Common
Pleas in Graley joined 2 cases that focused on the constitutionality of § 2307.42. Id. at
343 N.E.2d at 833-34.
128. Id. at -, 343 N.E.2d at 834; see Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2307.42 (Baldwin 1975)
(requiring plaintiff to list collateral payments in complaint).
129. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at -, 343 N.E.2d at 834; U.S. CoNsr. amend XIV, §1,
cl.2 (Equal Protection Clause of fourteenth amendment); Omo CoNsT. art. 1, §2 (equal
protection clause of Ohio Constitution); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2307.42 (Baldwin 1975)
(contested provision of 1975 Medical Malpractice Act).
130. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at -, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at -, 343 N.E.2d at 836.
134. Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
135. Id. The Graley court's disjointed treatment of the equal protection issue has provoked
harsh negative commentary. See Redish, supra note 35, at 774 n. 121 (observing weakness in
Graley opinion). One commentator has criticized the Graley court for failing to explain the
application of the compelling governmental est standard. See id. (explaining weakness in Graley
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The appropriate standard of review for equal protection challenges to
medical malpractice legislation is the rational basis test. The legislation
abrogating the Collateral Source Rule meets the criteria under the fourteenth
amendment equal protection rational basis test. 3 6 The courts that have
applied the rational basis standard of review to collateral source legislation
have adopted the United States Supreme Court's equal protection analysis
applicable to federal equal protection challenges. 37 Specifically, the Supreme
Court's equal protection doctrine directs courts to apply the rational basis
test to social and economic classifications and the strict scrutiny test to
suspect classes or fundamental interests, and to reserve the intermediate test
for classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, or privacy.'3 8 Because the
Supreme Court has delineated so clearly the strict scrutiny and intermediate
classifications, any classifications not comporting with either a strict scrutiny
or intermediate classification are subject to the rational basis test. 3 9 Col-
lateral source legislation classifying medical malpractice tort victims is
subject to the rational basis test by default because the legislation neither
qualifies as a strict scrutiny or intermediate classification. Under the rational
basis test, legislation is constitutional if a court can conceive of some
relevance between the classification and the state's objective. 14° Conceivably,
fewer and lower jury awards will lower insurance companies' costs. 14' The
insurance companies will then pass the reduced costs on to the physician in
the form of lower insurance rates. 42 Thus, collateral source legislation
classifying medical malpractice tort victims easily meets the minimal require-
ments of the rational basis test.
Many lower courts have applied the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
to the corresponding equal protection provision of the state constitution.
43
For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist
court's reasoning). Moreover, that commentator described the Graley court's equal protection
analysis as woefully superficial and recommended that courts refrain from following the
decision. Id. Another Ohio Court of Common Pleas, however, adopted the Graley court's
reasoning to strike down medical malpractice legislation and restored some value to the Graley
decision. See Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, -, 355 N.E.2d
903, 907 (1976) (adopting Graley court's reasoning).
136. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis test).
137. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis).
138. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing scope of United States
Supreme Court's rational basis standard of review).
139. See supra notes 42-43, 49-50 and accompanying text (explaining narrow scope of
United States Supreme Court's intermediate and strict scrutiny tests).
140. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (explaining rational basis test).
141. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining reasonable relationship between
legislative purpose and classification that statute creates).
142. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of legislation abrogating
Collateral Source Rule).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 58-94 (discussing courts applying United States
Supreme Court's equal protection guidelines).
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Medical Center adopted the United States Supreme Court's construction of
equal protection guarantees to the equal protection clause of the Iowa
Constitution.'4 Accordingly, in Iowa a court either will uphold a challenged
classification under the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution
or a court will strike down the legislation under both constitutions. 4
5
Similarly, the United States District Court of Kansas in Ferguson v. Garmon
incorporated the United States Supreme Court's equal protection standards
into the equal protection clause of the Kansas Constitution.'4 Courts that
parallel the Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine limit the intermediate
test to those classifications that the United States Supreme Court has
enumerated. 47 Accordingly, under a state's equal protection clause, an
individual's rights do not extend beyond those to which the United States
Supreme Court explicitly has applied either the intermediate or strict scrutiny
test.
Some state courts have elected to expand the intermediate test to clas-
sifications to which the United States Supreme Court has not applied the
intermediate test. 48 The courts that have applied the intermediate standard
of review to collateral source legislation either have extended an individual's
rights under a state constitution to include the right to recover for injury
or have expanded the intermediate review classifications enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court to include the medical malpractice tort vic-
tim. 49 The courts that have extended individual rights recognize that the
United States Supreme Court guarantees certain rights to all individuals. 50
The courts regard the rights under the United States Constitution as minimal
rights and have expanded the rights of the individual under state constitu-
tions.' 5' For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Carson v.
Maurer recognized the ability to grant greater rights under the New Hamp-
shire Constitution than the United States Constitution requires and, accord-
ingly, found that the challenged New Hampshire statute denied equal
protection to medical malpractice tort victims. 52 Alternatively, some courts
144. See supra text accompanying notes 76-94 (discussing Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist
Medical Center).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94 (discussing Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning
in applying rational basis test to medical malpractice legislation abrogating Collateral Source
Rule).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 57-74 (discussing Ferguson v. Garmon).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 (discussing Supreme Court's application of
intermediate test).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 95-135 (discussing courts that have modified
Supreme Court's equal protection analysis); cf. supra text accompanying notes 58-94 (discussing
courts that have adopted Supreme Court's equal protection analysis).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 150-56 (discussing method that courts have used
to expand Supreme Court's equal protection analysis).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 152-56 (discussing courts that have expanded
individual's rights).
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have expanded
individual rights under state constitution); infra note 152 and accompanying text (same).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24 (discussing Carson v. Maurer).
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have ignored the United States Supreme Court's limitations on the inter-
mediate standard of review to include the medical malpractice tort victim.'
53
For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Jones v. State Board of
Medicine indicated a desire to broaden the United States Supreme Court's
intermediate standard classifications. 54 Although the Jones court remanded
the case and, therefore, never applied a standard of review to the challenged
medical malpractice statute, the Jones court declared that the statute created
an obviously discriminatory classification and that a test more stringent
than the rational basis test was appropriate.' 5  In adopting the more stringent
means-focus test, the Supreme Court of Idaho included the medical mal-
practice tort victim in the classifications subject to intermediate review.
156
Whether a state or federal court applies the intermediate test by extending
an individual's rights under a state constitution or by explicitly expanding
the intermediate review classification that the Supreme Court recognizes,
the court has identified discrimination that the court cannot tolerate. A
statute may create unfair classifications and still not violate an individual's
equal protection guarantees. Specifically, state statutes incidentally may
create discriminatory classifications in an effort to develop an incremental
solution to an identified problem. 57 For example, legislatures could abrogate
the Collateral Source Rule in the isolated area of medical malpractice
litigation to provide relief to an identified medical malpractice insurance
crisis. 5 8 The statute might classify medical malpractice victims differently
than other tort victims but the statute is constitutional because the legislature
should be able to solve problems incrementally. 59 Incrementally solving
identified problems permits a legislature to monitor the effects of the
legislation on a small scale and to address the most critical areas of a
problem. 6' Abrogating the Collateral Source Rule in medical malpractice
153. See infra text accompanying notes 155-57 (discussing courts that have expanded
applicable classifications under intermediate test).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 97-117 (discussing Jones v. State Board of
Medicine).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16 (discussing Jones court's reasoning in
applying intermediate test).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16 (discussing Jones court's application of
intermediate test).
157. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (stating entitlement of
legislature to proceed step by step and to address phase of problem that seems most acute to
legislature).
158. See supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing cases in which legislature enacted
statute as relief to medical malpractice insurance crisis).
159. See, e.g., Crowe v. Wigglesworth, 623 F. Supp. 699, 705 (D. Kan. 1985) (justifying
state legislature's ability to abrogate Collateral Source Rule solely in medical malpractice
litigation as legislature's ability to implement incremental solutions); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116
Ariz. 576, 585, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (1977) (stating legislature's ability to proceed one step at
time); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Iowa 1980) (recog-
nizing legislature's ability to approach problem step by step).
160. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (allowing legislature to
incrementally solve problems).
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actions allows a legislature to provide immediate relief to the medical
malpractice insurance crisis and then to determine whether to adopt a
comparable measure in other areas of tort law. Accordingly, whether
legislation discriminates in fact inappropriately tests whether a statute vio-
lates the equal protection guarantees under a federal or state constitution.
In examining an equal protection challenge to a medical malpractice
statute modifying the Collateral Source Rule, federal and state courts have
chosen one of three possible approaches in determining the constitutionality
of the statute. Courts have upheld such legislation by following United
States Supreme Court precedent and applying the rational basis test.' 6'
Alternatively, courts have applied the intermediate test and struck down
this legislation by expanding the individual's rights under a state constitution
to include the right to recover for injury.)' Finally, courts have struck
down the legislation by broadening the classifications under the intermediate
standard of review to include medical malpractice tort victims.163 Of the
three choices, upholding the statute under the rational basis test most
strongly comports with the United States Supreme Court's equal protection
doctrine. 164 Because all courts since 1980 that have considered equal protec-
tion challenges to medical malpractice abrogating the Collateral Source Rule
have applied the rational basis test, the federal and state courts may reason
similarly.165 Until the Supreme Court relaxes the limitations on the inter-
mediate standard of review, medical malpractice legislation abrogating the
Collateral Source Rule should survive equal protection challenges.
FAYE L. FERGUSON
161. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (discussing rational basis test).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56 (discussing application of intermediate test
by expanding individual's rights).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47 (discussing notion of applying intermediate
test by expanding applicable classifications).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 51-135 (discussing merits of rational basis,
intermediate, and strict scrutiny tests).
165. See supra text accompanying note 54 (noting that cases decided since 1980 have
applied rational basis test).
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